Pliny on the portents of the bees

"Bees provide signs of future events both private and public, when a cluster of them hangs down in houses and temples — portents that have often been presaged by momentous events. They settled on the mouth of Plato when he was a young child and foretold the charm of his very pleasing eloquence. They settled in Drusus' camp at the time of our great victory at Arbalo: indeed augurs, who always think the presence of bees is a bad omen, are not invariably correct."

[Pliny the Elder, Natural History, Book 11, section 55, translated by John F. Healy]

Notes from March 24, 2010

"White on White," Kasimir Malevich, 1918

—Notes on "On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge," George Bealer

What are Intuitions?

(a) An intuition is an intellectual "seeming," not a sensory or introspective "seeming."

(b) Philosophical intuitions are a priori intuitions, not physical intuitions.

(c) They are not beliefs. I can have an intuition that something is right (a mathematical proof, for example) and simultaneously believe it is wrong. Also, belief is highly plastic; intuitions aren't.

(d) Not all intuitions are linguistic intuitions, i.e. intuitions about words and their applications.

(e) Not all intuitions are analytic, i.e. arriving from the combination of logic and the definition of terms.

(f) Intuitions can be mistaken. Locally, a single intuition can be wrong. Holistically, a person's systematization can be wrong.

Lycan on Objectivity in Ethics and Epistemology

"It's interesting that this parallel [between ethics and epistemology] goes generally unremarked. Moral subjectivism, relativism, emotivism, etc. are rife among both philosophers and ordinary people and yet very few of these same people would think even for a moment of denying the objectivity of epistemic value; that is, of attacking the reality of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable belief. I wonder why that is?"

[William Lycan, "Epistemic Value," Synthese 1985, pg. 137, h/t to Daniel Boyd]